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INTRODUCTION
The debate over legalization of prostitution has fractured the feminist
legal community for over a quarter century.' Pro-legalization advocates pro-
mote the benefits attending government regulation of prostitution, includ-
ing the ability to better prosecute sex crimes, increase public health and
educational resources for individuals in the commercial sex trade, and apply
labor and safety regulations to the commercial sex industry in the same
manner as they are applied to other businesses.2 Some anti-legalization ad-
vocates identify themselves as "new abolitionists,"3 and argue that govern-
ment recognition of prostitution reinforces gender inequality.4 Often, this
debate is framed in the hypothetical: What would happen if sex work were
legalized? When deploying the hypothetical, advocates elide the reality that
the commercial sex industry is legal in the United States for a large swathe
of workers in the industry: strippers.'
Stripping, as this Article will describe, is analogous to prostitution in
that every interaction between stripper and customer is a performance of
intimacy geared toward sexually and emotionally satisfying the customer in
exchange for money. During these performances, strippers are often isolated
with customers, thereby vulnerable to physical and sexual assault.6 Applying
the argument of legalization advocates, strippers should experience better
protection than individuals engaging in prostitution because their work is
1. See Katie Beran, Revisiting the Prostitution Debate: Uniting Liberal and Radical Femi-
nism in Pursuit of Policy Reform, 30 LAw & INEQ. 19, 21-23 (2012).
2. See generally K. KEMPADOO & J. DOEZEMA, GLOBAL SEx WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESIS-
TANCE AND REDEFINITION (1998); Norma Jean Almodovar, For Their Own Good:
The Results of the Prostitution Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians and judges, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 127 (1999).
3. This approach focuses on increasing criminal penalties for the purchase of sex and
considers prostitution "one of the most serious expressions of the oppression of and
discrimination against women." Donna M. Hughes, Governmental Approaches to the
Demand for Prostitution: The Emergence of the New Abolitionist Movement, in DE-
MAND DYNAMICS: THE FORCES OF DEMAND IN GLOBAL SEx TRAFFICKING 73, 78
(Morrison Torrey & Sara Dubin eds., 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 13 (1993); Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking and CulturalAmnesia: What
We Must Not Know in Order To Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running
Smoothly, 18 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 109 (2006).
5. Strippers are not the only individuals involved in the commercial sex trade whose
work is legal. Moreover, in the context of stripping, as will be discussed below, there
are blurry lines between the commission of legal and non-legal activities, both by
strippers and their patrons.
6. SHEIIA JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
GLOBAL SEx TRADE 96 (2009).
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legal and thus subject to government oversight.7 But does this argument
hold true?
This Article examines strippers' experiences as a case study for how the
legalization argument for prostitution falls short of its promises. Despite the
fact that stripping for money is legal, the stripper's body8 remains a site of
deep controversy in American culture and legal jurisprudence. Her' dance is
seen both as a threat to social order and an act of expression to be protected.
Her work, legally recognized labor, is nonetheless ignored when it is not
reviled. Unlike workers whose labor is seen as "legitimate" in the eyes of the
law, the stripper operates in a murky zone of legal protection laden with
qualifications and contradictions. While legalization has led to heavy regula-
tion, it has failed to protect strippers and has arguably made them more
vulnerable by lending a false veneer of legitimacy to strip clubs' labor prac-
tices. In the past thirty years, legal doctrine ha.s developed in two distinct
substantive areas that exacerbate strippers' poor working conditions: 1)
strippers' classification as independent contractors and consequential exclu-
sion from protective labor statutes, and 2) First Amendment jurisprudence
that permits regulation of strip clubs, but has not produced meaningful
protective regulations for strippers. These doctrinal developments are entan-
gled in underlying social narratives about the worth of sexual labor and the
place of the strip club in a morally upright community.
Strippers are commonly classified as independent contractors, mean-
ing they are not legally employed by the strip club.Io This classification
disqualifies them from statutory protections that solely apply to legal "em-
7. See Almodovar, supra note 2, at 127 ("Those prostitutes who are truly the victims of
violence are denied access to help because they are outside the law.").
8. While it is the stripper herself who is the focus of this Article, many of the laws
discussed focus only on the stripper's body, further objectifying strippers and legiti-
mizing the notion that they raise a "threat" to social order. For examples of laws that
fixate on the body itself, see, for example, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560,
585-86 (1991), where the Supreme Court wrangled with the constitutionality of
ordinances requiring strippers to wear g-strings and pasties.
9. Strippers will be referred to by using feminine pronouns throughout this paper be-
cause the strip club industry largely caters to the male gaze. See, e.g., Lynn Mills
Eckert, Language Games: Regulating Adult Establishments and the Objuscation of Gen-
der, 15 S. CAL. REv. L. & Soc. JusT. 239, 251 (2006). However, male strippers
experience many of the same legal paradoxes and economic dilemmas as female strip-
pers. This paper focuses primarily on gendered stereotypes that permeate the strip
club industry and are premised in patriarchal control over the feminized stripper,
whether male or female.
10. Carrie Benson Fischer, Employee Rights in Sex Work: The Strugglefor Dancers' Rights
as Employees, 14 LAw & INEQ. 521, 531-37 (1996).
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ployees."" However, strip clubs often exert a level of control over strippers
that undermines their independent contractor status.12 Even when strippers
successfully argue they are employees of their strip club, existing legal pro-
tections are ill-fitted to the realities of the strippers' jobs. These analytical
deficiencies could be remedied through doctrinal development and legisla-
tive reform, but courts and lawmakers have been reluctant to actively im-
prove strippers' working conditions, arguably for fear of being tainted by a
morally repugnant enterprise.
At the same time, local governments have zealously mobilized to regu-
late sexually oriented businesses in ways that destabilize rather than improve
the economic security of strippers. Communities strive to regulate strip
clubs out of existence,13 arguing under the First Amendment that the "sec-
ondary effects" (extrinsic harms) of strip clubs harm business and commu-
nity health, and therefore strip clubs should be zoned to the outskirts of
municipalities. In discussing negative secondary effects, the Supreme Court
addresses the intrinsic harm of gender-based violence in the strip club in a
fashion that is cursory at best.' 4 In glossing over strippers' vulnerability to
sexual harm, courts reveal their reticence to take up the cause of strippers in
their First Amendment analyses.
The source of inconsistency in government regulation is public refusal
to understand or address the systemic roots of the commercial sex industry
and gender-based exploitation. The result is that the stripper is mired in
legal regulations that impose more constrictions than protections. It is hard
to see how individuals engaging in prostitution would achieve a different
fate, which undermines the notion that legalizing prostitution provides
greater protection to those involved in it. In this Article, I argue that with-
out deeper cultural recognition of the gender-based inequities underlying
sexualized labor and meaningful acknowledgment of the dignity and worth
of members of the commercial sex industry, legal regulations on the indus-
11. KELLY HOLSOPPLE, STRIP CLUBS ACCORDING TO STRIPPERS: EXPOSING WORK-
PLACE SEXUAL VIOLENCE (1998), available at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/
hughes/stripc.htm.
12. Unlike employers' ordinary treatment of independent contractors, strip club opera-
tors heavily monitor strippers, including dictating their appearance, interactions with
customers, work schedules and minute to minute movements when working. See
Jeffreys, supra note 6, at 90-99.
13. See, e.g., Eric D. Kelly & Connie B. Cooper, Everything You Always Wanted to Know
About Regulating Sex Businesses, in PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORTS 2000
(Am. Plan. Ass'n, Nos. 495-496, 2000). See also infra, Section IV.
14. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560, 585-86 (1991) (mentioning sexual
assault in passing as one of many "evils" that takes place near strip clubs, including
prostitution and "other criminal activity").
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try will remain limited in their capacity to ameliorate the endemic sexism,
exploitation, and violence that strippers experience.
Section I of this Article describes the complex emotional and sexual
labor involved in stripping and examines how the stripper's precarious rela-
tionship with customers is further compromised by the exploitative wage
compensation models commonplace to strip clubs. In Section II, I argue
that the classification of strippers as independent contractors is doctrinally
unjustifiable. Then I examine the shortcomings of the existing legal protec-
tions for strippers, specifically in the realm of sexual harassment law. In
Section III, I turn to the First Amendment doctrine on stripping to explore
which regulations governments are willing to impose on strip clubs, and
how the stripper's body is discursively imagined within courts' varying
modes of analysis. Finally, Section IV explores the dynamic between the
bodies of law discussed in Sections II and III and argues that they leave the
stripper in a position as insecure, if not more so, than before government
regulation of strip clubs. I will use this conclusion to critique broader argu-
ments that legalizing prostitution would lead to greater protection for indi-
viduals engaged in prostitution.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: EMOTIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES
"No one but us really knows how or what it is like to be truly
naked."15
A. Emotional Labor at Social Cost
In order to fully understand the effects of legal doctrine on strippers, it
is critical to situate that doctrine within the sociological and economic con-
texts of the strip club. This Section will deconstruct the labor that occurs in
the strip club and investigate how different types of labor uniquely compro-
mise strippers' autonomy and physical integrity in the client-stripper inter-
action. The stripper's "job" is often reduced to removing her clothes for
money. However, strippers' testimonials reveal that beyond their physical
performance, intense emotional labor is required to create a fantasy that
customers will pay for.I6 Emotional labor is best described by Carol Ronai
and Carolyn Ellis, who state that a table dancer must:
15. Dawn Passar, I Dance for a Living, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 226 (1999).
16. See generally KIM PRICE-GLYNN, STRIP CLUB: GENDER, POWER, AND SEx WoRuK
105 (2010) (one stripper interviewed shared: "You have to make believe that you're
in love with everyone that you dance for"); KATHERINE FRANK, G-STRINGS AND
SYMPATHY: STRIP CLUB REGULARS AND MALE DESIRE 190 (2002) (one customer
interviewed stated, "There's a couple of cool girls that I can hang out with [at the
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[B]e a charming and sexy companion, keep the customer inter-
ested and turned on, make him feel special and be a good reader
of character and a successful salesperson. At the same time, she
must deal with her own negative feelings about the customer or
herself, negotiate limits and then keep him under control to
avoid getting fired by management.17
This labor has been referred to as "counterfeit intimacy,"18 "seduction
rhetoric,"19 or "commodified [sic] intimacy."20 Strippers must delicately
gauge and conform to the emotional needs of each customer. At the same
time, they must attempt to draw clear boundaries to manage possessive cus-
tomers, sexual demands, and physical aggression. 21 One example of this ne-
gotiation occurs during the lap-dance. STAR, a Toronto-based website
providing safety tips for strippers, advised: "If a customer is trying to man-
handle you, try holding his hands in a sexy way to control him. But be
aware that touching violates some municipal bylaws. If you're being as-
saulted, scream."22 Thus, strippers are constantly blurring the line between
fantasy and reality and drawing tenuous distinctions between manageable
"manhandling" and criminal assault. Reaching the appropriate balance for
each client demands keen intuitions and strong boundaries.
This negotiation may come at a high price, since part of a stripper's
duty is to conform to historicized, racialized, and classed notions of men's
sexual desires and fetishes. Becki Ross explored performances of "colonial
tropes" at one exotic dance club in 1950s Vancouver, including dancers
costumed as Nubian slaves.23 She explained that at the club, the work was
"never about sex alone . . . it was tangled up with economic, cultural and
political privileges of a white body politic."24 More recently, Katherine
Frank interviewed an African American stripper who reported wearing cos-
tumes with animal prints to evoke a "jungle theme," "consciously playing
strip club Diamond Dolls] that are doing it not so much to make money but to hang
out. That's the ones I like best. [pause] Whether it's real or not.").
17. Carol Rambo Ronai & Carolyn Ellis, Turn-Ons for Money: Interactional Strategies of
the Table Dancer, 18 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 271, 272 (1989).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 283.
20. Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized
Industries, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 65, 79 (2006).
21. Ronai & Ellis, supra note 17, at 272.
22. SEX TRADE ADVOCACY AND RESEARCH, DANCING MATTERS 4 (2004), available at
http://web2.uwindsor.calcourses/sociology/maticka/starlindex.html.
23. Becki L. Ross, Bumping and Grinding on the Line: Making Nudity Pay, 46 LABOUR/




on" customers' racialized expectations of black women, including hypersex-
uality and aggression. 25 In a comparative study of "gentlemen's clubs" and
"working-class strip joints," Mary Nell Trautner noted that tips were far
more likely to be received on the body, and flashing was more common, in
"working-class" establishments. 26 Thus, strippers must not only sell sex, but
create a custom-made fantasy for each customer, often sacrificing dignity
and personal authenticity in the process.
B. Economic Marginalization: Wages, Tip-Outs and Stage Fees
Beyond the problems intrinsic to selling sexual performances, strippers
operate in a precarious economic environment with little to no job security,
and minimal, if any, legal recourse in the face of labor rights violations.
Strippers rarely receive any compensation except their tips, 27 a reality that is
seldom communicated to customers. 28 Some strip clubs charge for entry,
which leads customers to erroneously believe that strippers receive some
fraction of the club's revenues. Strippers often cannot charge for table
dances, as that would amount to asking for money in exchange for sex,
which could open them to prosecution for sexual solicitation. 29 Thus, they
must couch their requests for tips in gentler language, asking for "suggested
contributions."3o In addition, some strippers describe "upping the ante,
where personal boundary lines are drawn and redrawn as more money is
offered for requests that inch closer to propositions for prostitution.31 This
is particularly the case in strip clubs where other strippers engage in prosti-
tution and create competition because propositions are more frequent and
"customers [have] the opportunity to choose from women willing to engage
in a variety of sexual acts."32
Even more significantly, the stripper's economic realities are shaped by
the club itself. Strippers have an extremely ambiguous legal relationship
with the clubs that hire them to dance. This ambiguity has led clubs to
25. Frank, supra note 16, at 218-19.
26. Mary Nell Trautner, Doing Gender, Doing Class: The Performance of Sexuality in Ec-
otic Dance Clubs, 19 GENDER & Soc'y 771, 782 (2005).
27. Fischer, supra note 10, at 532.
28. Judith Lynn Hanna, Undressing the First Amendment and Corsetting the Striptease
Dancer, 42 DRAMA REV. 38, 60 (1998).
29. Ronai & Ellis, supra note 17, at 275. Strip clubs are also sites of sex trafficking in the
United States. For example, in 2005, a trafficker out of Brooklyn, New York was
prosecuted for trafficking twenty-five Russian women to perform in strip clubs. Jef-
freys, supra note 6, at 95.
30. Id
31. BERNADETTE BARTON, STRIPPED: INSIDE THE LIVES OF ExoTIC DANCERS 95
(2006).
32. Id. at 96.
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utilize and take advantage of "taxi-cab" or "hair salon" contract models that
require strippers to rent out a space in the club to dance.3 Thus, it is cus-
tomary for strippers to give a "stage fee," where they pay a down payment to
dance at the club.34 Other clubs enforce "tip-outs," where a substantial per-
centage of strippers' tips are paid back to the club, and/or distributed to
other employees, such as the bouncer, DJ, or bartenders.35
There are many permutations to the above contract models that stifle
strippers' opportunities to reap financial gain. D~jA vu Club in San Fran-
cisco charged each dancer $9 for every $20 nude lap dance that she sold, in
addition to a $10 ladies' drink fee, regardless of whether she drank.36 Often,
clubs collect these fees at a flat rate, regardless of the tips a stripper has
collected for a specific shift.3 7 In Austin, Holly Wilmet reported that the
collection of "daily registration fees, taxes, and tip-outs cost dancers $30-50
per shift."38 Dancers at Mitchell Brothers O'Farell Theater in San Francisco
were required to "pony up" a month's worth of stage fees prior to working
their first shift.' Other clubs impose lap-dance quotas on dancers, obliging
them to sell a certain number of lap-dances per shift for which proceeds
must go to the club. Falling short of an assigned quota can serve as grounds
for termination. 40 Thus, strippers will often pay to work, and leave their
shifts owing debts to their managers.
This compensation structure shapes strippers' interactions with both
their fellow strippers and their customers. The tip-out model creates a
highly competitive working environment where strippers working during
slow shifts vie for customers.4  This type of cutthroat work environment
erodes workplace camaraderie, thereby foreclosing opportunities for strip-
pers to organize for better wages, benefits and workplace safety. 42
33. Passar, supra note 15. Such comparisons refer to business models of many hair salons
and taxi driving companies, in which the worker purchases a seat in a salon or taxi-
cab on an inventory loan from the salon or cab proprietor and then repays the salon
or cab company through their commission. This model results in service workers
starting out indebted to the business proprietors for whom they work.
34. Sarah Chun, An Uncommon Alliance: Finding Empowerment for Exotic Dancers
Through Labor Unions, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 231, 236 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Holly J. Wilmet, Naked Feminism: The Unionization of the Adult Entertainment In-
dustry, 7 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL' Y& L. 465, 483 n.11 4 (1999).
37. Id. at 483.
38. Id. at 483 n.112.
39. Id
40. Id. at 482 n.105.
41. Samantha A. Majic, LIVE! NUDE!. . . Organized Workers? Examining the Organiza-
tion of Sex Workers in Las Vegas, Nevada 24-25 (June 19, 2005) (unpublished confer-
ence paper) (on file with the Inst. for Women's Policy Research).
42. Price-Glynn, supra note 16, at 56, 146.
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Workplace competition is even more problematic when viewed in con-
junction with the stripper's relationship to her customer. As discussed
above, strippers' economic relationships with their customers are complex
and have the potential for friction when strippers set boundaries that cus-
tomers challenge, either through physical force or economic coercion.4 3 Iso-
lated from the greater dynamics of the strip club, strippers' must
continuously negotiate the line between customer satisfaction and illegality.
They must also weigh the benefits of a good tip against the potential for
abusive conduct from their patrons. The added pressure of having to avoid
incurring debt to the club may lead strippers to permit customer behavior
that they otherwise would not tolerate. Thus, the notion of consent be-
comes dangerously murky, as workers submit to customers' advances for the
sole purpose of breaking even.4 4 Since tipping occurs on the body, dancers
might be more willing to allow customers to grope them when they tio.45
This creates a nebulous transition from stripping to prostitution, placing
workers in an even more unstable and risky situation, 46 where before long
"'hustle' becomes 'solicitation,' customers become 'johns,' strip clubs be-
come 'bordellos' and club owners become 'pimps."'"7
Thus, the stripper operates in an extraordinarily competitive and high-
stakes economic environment. The nature of her work places her in a frame-
work of false autonomy: creating a coercive "choice" between accruing debt
to the club or redrawing personal boundaries of consent and bodily integ-
rity. While the tip-out and stage fee structures compound the intense pres-
sure facing the stripper, they highlight strippers' existing state of
compromised autonomy. At its root, the stripper's job is a constant negotia-
tion between personal safety and monetary profit. As one stripper poign-
antly recounted, in choosing a customer, she would often ask herself, "What
do I want more right now? Money or someone non-threatening to sit
with?"4 8 Another stripper used a fake name and address with customers to
prevent stalking and sexual assault, because fellow strippers had been fol-
lowed home by patrons. 9 These strategies reveal an additional layer of emo-
tional labor that strippers engage in: not only must they manipulate and
43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
44. This concept was developed in an interview with Anita Allen, Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 24, 2009).
45. One example of tipping on the body is putting cash tips in a stripper's garter,
thereby providing an opportunity for customers to make physical contact. Ronai &
Ellis, supra note 17, at 277.
46. Wilmet, supra note 36, at 482.
47. Id.
48. Ronai & Ellis, supra note 17, at 279.
49. Price-Glynn, supra note 16, at 92.
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manage the choices of their customers, but they must also reconcile them-
selves to the boundaries they "choose" to set for their transactions.
As will be demonstrated in the following sections, government regula-
tion of strip clubs to "protect" strippers against the above realities has come
in all the wrong places. While the above account demonstrates strippers'
extreme vulnerability to abuse and exploitation, legal doctrine has focused
primarily on the stripper's threat to public morality, crime, and disease.50
Where strip club regulations could equalize power differentials between
strippers and their employers, laws instead have vested deference in employ-
ers, allowing them to evade legal obligations concerning wages, collective
bargaining, protection from harassment and workers' compensation. This
legal trajectory reflects cultural ambivalence toward the stripper, trivializing
her as undeserving of legal protection while enforcing stringent legal regula-
tion to protect the body politic from her presence.5 '
II. STRIPPERS AS UNPROTECTED WORKERS: A LEGAL BLIND EYE
SHAPES LABOR PROTECTIONS IN THE ADULT
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
We're not fighting for the money. We're fighting for the human
rights and respect every paid worker gets.52
This Section will examine how strippers' legal classification as inde-
pendent contractors5 3 reflects the broader trend of lawmakers deregulating
the employment relationship to enhance labor market flexibility. It will then
expose how strippers' independent contract classification misrepresents the
actual dynamics of the strip club, given that strippers work in a tightly
controlled, heavily monitored environment that hardly bespeaks a legally
cognizable "independent contract" relationship. Where true independent
contractors exercise greater autonomy and flexibility in their work, strippers
have little to no control over their terms and conditions of employment.54
In misclassifying the employment relationship, employers are able to evade
vital workplace protections for strippers. Without the "employee" status
that more aptly defines their relationship to strip clubs, strippers exist in a
vacuum of legal protection. They are vulnerable to workplace injury, harass-
50. Amy Adler, Girh! Girls! Girs!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1108, 1147 (2005).
51. Id
52. Fischer, supra note 10, at 554 (referencing a news article quoting Julie Chavira, age
23, a stripper working out of Minneapolis).
53. Id. at 531.
54. See Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 Comp. LAB.
L.J. 503 (1997); see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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ment, discrimination, retaliation, and wage violation with no legal recourse
against their employers. Yet, even if strippers were categorized as employees,
employment protections themselves-particularly sexual harassment law-
inadequately address the harms suffered by strippers.
A. Strippers as Independent Contractors: A Void of Legal Protection
In the past thirty years, employment relationships have been trans-
formed from long-term assurances of job security and fixed pensions into
transient relationships, short tenures, and transferable benefits.5 This trend
exacerbates the limited nature of protections under major federal employ-
ment laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Title VII, worker's
compensation statutes, and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
which only apply to legal "employees."56 "Employee" is a legal term of art
determined through doctrinal tests that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion. The most standard tests for determining whether a worker is an "em-
ployee" are the common law agency test, the economic realities test, or some
hybrid of the two.58
The common law agency analysis focuses on employers' control over
their workers as the deciding factor of whether the worker should be consid-
ered an employee or an independent contractor. 9 Factors that are com-
monly taken into account are: the party exercising control over details of the
work, the type of occupation, the level of supervision, the level of skill re-
quired for the work, the supplier of the instrumentalities of the work, the
length of time for which the person is employed, the method of payment,
and the subjective beliefs of each party as to whether they are in an employ-
ment relationship.60
The economic realities test focuses more heavily on the worker's de-
pendence on the employer to gauge whether the worker is sufficiently "tied"
to the business to be considered an employee.61 Factors taken into account
include: the hirer's control of work duties; the method of payment; the
55. See generally Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A
Historical and Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 153 (2003).
56. See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL ARNOw-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EM-
PLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONs 14 (2d ed. 2011) (cit-
ing 29 U.S.C § 158(b)(4)(i) (2006); 29 U.S.C. 5 201(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f) (2006)).
57. Id. at 5-7, 15.
58. Id. at 15.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220 (1958).
60. Id
61. For an example of a case application of the economic realities test, see Beck v. Boce
Group, L.C., 391 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
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rights of hiring, firing, and discipline; and whether the performance of du-
ties is an integral part of the employer's business. 62 The economic realities
test tends toward a more liberal construction of employee status, and thus is
used when determining workers' qualification for statutory protections that
define employment broadly, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act.63
While the independent contractor relationship is not a uniformly neg-
ative legal classification, it is harmful to strippers because they gain none of
its benefits. Strippers work in a highly controlled environment. Often, they
do not choose their own work shifts, nor do they always have a say over the
number of shifts they work.64 As discussed above, their employers closely
regulate their wages.6 5 There are strict rules regulating how many stage
dances strippers must perform per shift, 66 how often they are allowed to
take breaks,67 what costumes they wear,'6 8 and even how many of them are
allowed to use the bathroom at any given time.6 9 Some club managers in-
stall cameras in dressing rooms to monitor strippers' conduct for illegal ac-
tivity.70 When strippers violate rules, miss shifts or are tardy, clubs will
impose fines to discipline them?" Bouncers, bartenders, and DJs also par-
ticipate in the monitoring of strippers as part of their job duties, ensuring
that strippers do not engage in sexual contact with customers. 72
Given these strict regulations, under both the common law agency test
and the economic realities test, strippers can make a persuasive claim that
62. See, e.g., Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, (11th Cir. 1996) (In determining
whether workers were jointly employed by defendant, the court examined "the na-
ture and degree of control over the workers . . . the degree of supervision of the
work . . . the right of the employer to hire, fire and modify work conditions. . .the
power to determine pay rates and method of payment . .. preparation of payroll and
payment of wages. . ownership of facilities where work occurred . . . performance of
a line job integral to business . . . investment in equipment and facilities"); Lilley v.
BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, (1992) (upholding lower court's holding that plaintiff, a
salesman who received commission, was an employee under the ADEA because he
had to request authorization to quote prices to potential buyers, was provided with
an office and stationery with the defendant's name on it, and was "integrated into
BTM's normal business operations").
63. See Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
64. Fischer, supra note 10, at 532.
65. Id
66. Id. at 545.
67. Id
68. Id.
69. See Reich v. Circle C Inv., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cit. 1993).
70. Ross, supra note 23, at 249.
71. Fischer, supra note 10, at 534.
72. Kim Price, "Keeping the Dancers in Check"- The Gendered Organization of Stripping
Work in the Lion's Den, 22 GENDER & Soc'Y 367, 375-77 (2008).
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they are legal employees. However, the common trend has been for employ-
ers to misclassify strippers as independent contractors,7 3 thereby avoiding
their legal obligations without relinquishing any of their control. Thus,
strippers operate in a contrived legal framework that affords them all the
costs and none of the benefits of an independent contract. The stripper's
status as an independent contractor reflects a larger trend by employers to-
wards strategic de-regulation of the employment relationship through mis-
application of existing legal rules.74 When strippers are refused the
protections and entitlements their legal relationship requires, their rights are
being violated.7 As independent contractors, strippers are commonly de-
nied medical coverage, vacation time, medical leave, or family leave.76 Yet,
even when members of the commercial sex industry are able to negotiate
benefits into their employment contract, contracting around sexual labor
has had little success in courts. For example, pornography actors have been
reluctant to seek redress in court because of their ambiguous legal status.77
When workers move forward with their cases, courts are likely, as a matter
of public policy, to be ambivalent about enforcing adult entertainment con-
tracts. Even when pornography contracts do not entail illegal behavior, they
implicate policy concerns regarding specific performance and prostitution.78
For example, California courts have held that contracts are unenforceable if
they use sexual consideration (that is, sexual performance in exchange for
money) because sexual consideration raises public policy concerns about
prostitution.7 9 Applying this analysis, it is reasonable to expect that strippers
would encounter challenges in enforcing their contract rights if courts inter-
pret their damages claims as seeking compensation for sexual services.
B. Fair Labor Standards Act
In the absence of enforceable contract rights, workers turn to statutory
protections to vindicate their rights against their employers. Most statutory
protections at the federal level apply specifically to "employees," which
places strippers outside the compass of federal legal protections.
73. See Fischer, supra note 10 at 531.
74. Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misclassification of Workers
and Its Effect On the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. IrNr. L.J. 105, 106 (2009-2010).
75. Fischer, supra note 10, at 535.
76. Hanna, supra note 28, at 59-60.
77. Andrew Gilden, Sexual (Re)consideration: Adult Entertainment Contracts and the Prob-
lem ofEnforceability, 95 GEO. L.J. 541, 546 (2007) (explaining that adult entertain-
ers are distrustful of the legal system due to historical persecution and do not believe
they can successfully sue on an industry contract when it has been breached).
78. Id. at 547, 557.
79. Id. at 557 (citing Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976)).
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The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulates the wages and hours of
low-skilled workers to ensure that employers pay the federal minimum wage
and overtime when employees work over forty hours per week.80 The FLSA
has been the most heavily applied legal protection in the context of strip-
pers' rights. Several courts have granted strippers employee status when de-
termining their legal entitlements under the FLSA in lawsuits against their
employers. In Reich v. Circle C Investments, the U.S. Secretary of Labor
brought an action against a strip club for wage and record-keeping viola-
tions of the FLSA.8 1 The court used the economic realities test and found
that the plaintiff strippers were eligible for FLSA protections as employees.82
Similarly, in Jeffcoat v. Department of Labor, the Alaska Department of La-
bor brought an action on behalf of a dancer whose employer maintained
that she was an independent contractor of the club.83 The court found that
the dancer had a valid complaint for wage violations and qualified as an
employee under the economic realities test, despite the fact that the club
ordered her to purchase a business license and her wages were primarily
earned through tips. 4 However, this line of reasoning has been largely con-
fined to the application of the FLSA, possibly because the FLSA contains
particularly explicit statutory language indicating that the employment rela-
tionship should be construed broadly to fulfill the legislative purposes of the
act.8 5 It remains unclear whether courts will apply this more expansive rea-
soning to other labor laws, or whether the argument that strippers are em-
ployees will remain confined to the FLSA context.
80. See generally, Compliance Assistance - Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) - Wage and
Hour Division (WHD), UNITED STATEs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/Flsalindex.htm.
81. Reich v. Circle C Inv., 998 F.2d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Martin v. Priba
Corp., Civ. A. No. 3: 91-CV-2786-G, 1992 WL 486911 at *5 (ruling that where
dancers had signed an independent contractor contract, dancers were employees
within the meaning of FLSA because of dancers' economic dependence on the club).
82. Reich, 998 F.2d at 328-29.
83. Jeffcoat v. Alaska Dep't. of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Alaska 1987).
84. Jeffcoat, 732 P.2d at 1077-78. The court also stated that "the parties' intent to
contract is not a determinative factor." Id. at 1077.
85. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (ruling that the
terms of the FLSA have been interpreted with "striking breadth" to "stretch . . . the
meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a
strict application of traditional agency law principles"); Thornton v. Crazy Horse,
Inc., No. 3:06-cv-00251-TMB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82770, at *57 (D. Alaska
2012) ("The remedial purposes of the FLSA necessarily requires a 'broad' interpreta-
tion of the term .... ).
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C National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits employer inter-
ference or obstruction when employees engage in protected concerted activi-
ties, including organizing for "mutual aid and protection . "... . 6 Dancers'
unionizing efforts began in the 194 0s, when the American Guild of Variety
Artists litigated on behalf of a large number of dancers for payment of the
minimum wage.87 In 1971, the Ninth Circuit held that various entertainers
were not legally "employees" of the defendant nightclub in an appeal from a
National Labor Relations Board decision.8 8
Without protection under the NLRA, strippers are vulnerable to retal-
iation from club owners for attempting to assert their rights as employees
through litigation or collective action. For example, when the Las Vegas
Dancers' Alliance (LVDA) attempted to organize rallies in 2002, club own-
ers threatened retaliation against dancers if they participated in the rally.8 9
While the rally was organized to challenge an expensive city requirement
that dancers purchase "work cards" to demonstrate they were not involved
in criminal activity, club owners feared the rally would foster underlying
organizing goals, such as establishing an official bargaining unit for the
LVDA and fighting for official recognition of dancers' employee status. 0 As
a result, the rally turned out dismal numbers and organizing efforts dwin-
dled.9 1 As independent contractors, the dancers did not have a right of ac-
tion under the NLRA against the club owners who crushed their organizing
efforts.92
One of the few successful unionizing attempts was at the Lusty Lady
Dance Theater in San Francisco. In 1997, dancers were able to unionize,
ultimately negotiating a seniority-based pay scale, dance, lunch and prep
breaks, and removal of one-way windows for peep shows.93 Removal of the
one-way windows was particularly important to workers because they al-
lowed customers to videotape strippers without their knowledge or con-
sent.9 4 Dancers at the Lusty Lady were able to engage in more robust
collective bargaining negotiations with theater management than dancers at
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58.
87. Wilmet, supra note 36 at 466.
88. Id.; Harrah's Club v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 446 F.2d 471, 480 (9th Cir. 1971).
89. Majic, supra note 41, at 22.
90. Id. at 20-22.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 23; 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (stating that "The term 'employee' . . . shall
not include . . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor").
93. Wilmet, supra note 36, at 467.
94. Siobhan Brooks, Exotic Dancing and Unionizing: The Challenges of Feminist and An-
tiracist Organizing at the Lusty Lady Theater, 33 SIECUS REPORT 12, 13 (2005).
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other establishments." Unionization was in part made possible by partner-
ing with the Exotic Dancers Alliance, an organization that had been fighting
to achieve employee status for dancers.96 To date, no other strip club has
unionized in the United States.97 The Lusty Lady's isolated success demon-
strates how the stilted legal conceptualization of strippers' employment sta-
tus prevents the NLRA from being an effective mechanism for protecting
and fostering industry-wide organizing efforts among strippers.
D. Title VII
Title VII is protective legislation that was passed to prevent discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, religion, national origin, and gender in the pub-
lic and private workplace. Title VII, like the above statutes, requires workers
to be "employees" to qualify for protected status.98 Title VII enables em-
ployees to file a lawsuit against their employers for failure to prevent or
redress harassment, either by staff or third parties (customers), if employers
should reasonably have known that such harassment was likely to occur.99
Sexual harassment law developed out of Title VII's prohibition on sex
discrimination and seems the most likely fit for strippers' claims. However,
wooden applications of sexual harassment law present yet more barriers to
meaningful protection for strippers under federal anti-discrimination laws.
To qualify for sexual harassment protection, an employee must show harass-
ment because of sex that is "severe or pervasive" enough to "alter the condi-
tions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."oo Even if a stripper qualifies as a protected employee, it is
unclear whether judges would view a Title VII claim favorably because of
the complicated interplay between sexual harassment law and the essence of
the stripper's job duties.ol
Social commentators and strippers themselves have expressed skepti-
cism as to whether a worker who signs up to sexually entice customers can
credibly claim sexual harassment when their enticement is successful. One
95. Id
96. Id. at 13-14.
97. Rachel Aimee, In Search ofStripper Solidarity, IN THESE TIMES, May 7, 2012, http://
www.inthesetimes.com/article/13089/in-search-of stripper-solidarity/.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006). To determine employee status under Title VII, courts
will apply the economic realities test, the common law agency test, or some hybrid of
the two, as discussed above in notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text.
99. See Breda v. Wolf Camer & Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2000).
100. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
101. Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It
Support a Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought by a Nude Dancer? 24 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 291 (1998).
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stripper commented: "obviously it would be ridiculous to accuse a cus-
tomer, who pays specifically for the right to regard a dancer as a sexual
object, of breaking sexual harassment codes when he does so."lO2 A CBS
commentator disparaged Hooters' waitresses for bringing a sexual harass-
ment claim stating, "These are women who deliberately sought out and
accepted employment at a place called Hooters. Did they really think it was
about owls?""o" In response to lawsuits, Hooters wrote clear terms into its
employment manual that waitresses were required to sign before accepting
employment. The terms read:
I hereby acknowledge and affirm .. . that the Hooters concept is
based on female sex appeal and the work environment is one in
which joking and innuendo based on female sex appeal is com-
monplace. I also expressly acknowledge and affirm that I do not
find my job duties, uniform requirements or work environment
to be offensive, intimidating, hostile or unwelcomed.104
While technically employees cannot contract to.waive their right to
file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,' 05 this
clause is designed to weaken potential harassment lawsuits by demonstrating
that waitresses did not find behavior that could constitute harassment to be
subjectively offensive. Moreover, such clauses have the more insidious effect
of misleading workers into thinking they have signed away their rights, even
though such a clause would not bar them from filing a discrimination
charge.
Legal commentators have advanced parallel arguments for denying
strippers' sexual harassment claims in the tort language of "assumption of
risk." Strippers, they argue, should be able to exercise agency in deciding to
assume the risk of harassment by customers in the course of their job du-
ties.10 6 Thus, the argument goes, strip club liability is superseded by the
mutual understanding between strippers and club owners when entering
into the employment contract. Part of strippers' "job duties" is managing
third-party risk. In describing her own job duties, a stripper recounted, "a
stripper must entice her audience but keep an eye out for the type of guy
102. Id. at 299.
103. Id. at 295.
104. Id. at 296.
105. U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Understanding waivers of discrimination
claims in Employee Severance Agreements, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda-
severance-agreements.html (last updated Apr. 2010).
106. McGinley, supra note 20, at 69-70 (citing Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should
There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1145 (1995)).
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who tries to take liberties while he attempts to tuck a dollar in your G-
string."107 Some clubs have gone so far as to threaten punishing strippers for
"mismanaging" their harassment. In one strip club, the employer stated:
Unless the customer is being a blatant asshole (continuing to
break the laws after them being explained to him), I see no rea-
son to kick anybody out. What I do see is kicking the dancer out
after being completely assured that you know she knows the laws
and [is] allowing the customer to continue to break them with-
out seeking assistance. 0 8
The assumption of risk model reflects cultural attitudes, some of
which are internalized by strippers, that a woman who chooses to undress
for men for a living is "asking" for aggressive male advances. This attitude is
reflected in the comments of op-ed editor Stephanie Robertson, who criti-
cized Hooters' plaintiffs: "at some point people have to assume responsibil-
ity for their actions and use common sense. A woman should anticipate
sexual remarks if she prances around with various parts of her anatomy
hanging out."1o9
From a legal perspective, this argument is unprecedented. Title VII
protections against sexual harassment are not seen as "negotiable" in any
other profession. In no other context would it be acceptable for workers to
sign a contract saying they wanted to place a monetary premium on their
bodily integrity. 0 And yet, such terms and conditions are memorialized in
the handbooks of establishments like Hooters and strip clubs. From a prac-
tical perspective, this practice is untenable because it places the burden of
risk management on the stripper, who is the economic actor least able to
control customers' behavior.' Bouncers and club management have often
installed monitoring devices for the strippers, and these systems could easily
be used to protect strippers from harassment as well.112 Furthermore, the
club foresees harassment of its workers as keenly as the workers themselves.
However, given the wage structure in most clubs, it is the club that reaps the
profit of harassment. Thus, the club should assume the risk.3 To delegate
management of aggressive behavior to the only workers whose wages are
contingent on customer satisfaction is a farcical attempt to control third
107. Burstein, supra note 101, at 302.
108. Price-Glynn, supra note 16, at 93.
109. Burstein, supra note 101, at 304.
110. Id. at 311-12
111. McGinley, supra note 20, at 91.
112. Id. at 92.
113. Burstein, supra note 101, at 307.
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party harassment. Deborah Ellis, the former legal director of the NOW Le-
gal Defense Fund, denounces the assumption of risk argument: "women
should not have to choose between having a job and being treated with
dignity."' 14 The editorial remark noted above, that women should "antici-
pate" certain male reactions when they bare their bodies, is uncannily simi-
lar to a well-entrenched rape myth. Rape victims who are not virgins or who
were victimized as a result of non-conformity to traditional gender roles (for
example, being out late at night without a male chaperone) are often por-
trayed as lacking in common sense, which becomes repainted as the central
cause of their victimization." Similarly, women who choose to strip expose
their sexuality in the masculine public sphere, and thus are viewed as "fair
game" for sexual violence."' 6
Applying assumption of risk doctrine to strippers who are assaulted,
abused and humiliated at work rests on the foundational premise that the
service economy should meet consumer demand for women's sexual subor-
dination. From a feminist perspective, the limitations of sexual harassment
law mirror the distorted autonomy presented to strippers when club owners
appropriate their wages through imposing tip-out and stage fee wage struc-
tures. Here, security from harassment is an anomaly, since dancers can only
earn decent wages at the expense of their bodily integrity.
The stripper's vulnerability to unchecked harassment is the product of
a problematic market analysis where power rather than sex becomes a legiti-
mate object of sale. Lack of legal or legislative intervention, either to restruc-
ture current wage models in strip clubs or to more stringently apply sexual
harassment law, reflects a discomfort by government officials to take mean-
ingful steps to protect members of the commercial sex industry. While the
past century has seen the enactment of a plethora of protective statutes for
employees' rights, and in spite of the fact that stripping is legal "work," the
laws have limited use because stripping is not work that courts and
lawmakers consider worth protecting."' 7 Strippers' rights have been
marginalized, obscured, and left to resolution through fundamentally asym-
metrical power relationships within the four walls of the strip club.
114. Id. at 306.
115. Id. (quoting a Minnesota attorney who brought a lawsuit against Hooters, critiquing
the assumption of risk defense by using a rape analogy: "People say, 'Didn't she ask
for it? She walked in the park. Didn't she ask for it? She went out with the guy."').
116. McGinley, supra note 20, at 91.
117. Fischer, supra note 10, at 523-24 ("In its reluctance to embrace legal endorsement of
sexually-oriented work, American society has been slow to acknowledge that these
women [strippers] are denied their workplace rights.").
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E. The Social Ramifications of Government Inaction
The root of strippers' shortage of labor protection is their inability to
claim employee status, placing them outside the ambit of statutory protec-
tions against wage violations, employer retaliation, discrimination, and un-
safe working conditions. However, this is a threshold barrier that often
diverts inquiry into the larger problem: many existing protections fail to
address the complex emotional and sexual labor strippers perform. The un-
willingness of courts and legislators to take up the cause of strippers' em-
ployment rights reflects lawmakers' unwillingness to enter such a morally
contested site of labor and exploitation. One can conceive this indifference
as complicity with the widespread and unpunished rape, physical battery,
and sexual assault that permeate the strip club. In sitting out this legal fight,
lawmakers and judges demonstrate a lack of political will to protect mem-
bers of the commercial sex industry, regardless of the fact that their work is
legal, and thus ripe for regulation.
III. STRIPPERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: RELUCTANCE TO
REGULATE IN THE MIDST OF PROTECTIVE ZEAL
FOR PUBLIC MORALITY
To invoke the First Amendment to protect the activity involved
in this case [stripping] trivializes and demeans that great
Amendment.""a
While the federal government has been reticent to protect strippers'
rights, municipalities and state legislatures have energetically regulated strip
clubs to protect communities from the perceived dangers of disease, prop-
erty devaluation, community erosion, and crime. Erotic expression was the
most litigated First Amendment issue in the mid to late 1990s. 19 Localities
have enacted a plethora of zoning regulations, no-touch ordinances, anti-
nudity statutes and licensing requirements to drive strip clubs out of busi-
ness.120 Entire handbooks have been created around regulations on adult
118. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 89 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
119. Ross, supra note 23, at 249 (citing Clyde DeWitt, Legal Commentary, ADULT VIDEO
NEWS, July 1995, at 112-17).
120. See generally, Kelly & Cooper, supra note 13; see also Judith Lynne Hanna, Exotic
Dance Adult Entertainment: A Guide for Planners and Policy-Makers, 20 J. PLAN.
LITERATURE 116, 131 (2005).
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entertainment establishments.12 1 Community battles have produced an
amorphous body of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the relation-
ship of free speech to the strip club. The dearth of legislation protecting
workers, in stark contrast to heavy regulations protecting "community val-
ues," further illustrates the infusion of cultural disdain and fear of the strip-
per into legal regimes. Even when the government regulates strip clubs,
regulations are often designed to protect society from the stripper, rather
than to afford the stripper meaningful protection against sexual exploita-
tion. This Section will present the First Amendment doctrine relating to
nude dancing and then proceed to critiques of the methodology and logic
that inform courts' decision-making. Then, it will examine the legal dialec-
tic of the stripper as a threat to social order and community cohesion. Fi-
nally, this Section will survey a new wave of regulations on strip clubs that
specifically focus on violence prevention.
A. First Amendment Doctrine for Sexually-Oriented Businesses
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that the First Amendment
protected nude dancing as expressive speech in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim.122 From that point on, states could not limit expressive "erotic
dance" without first identifying a compelling state interests in doing so. The
level of scrutiny applied to state interests became the deciding factor in up-
holding a statute. Once the Court deemed erotic dancing a form of pro-
tected speech, any regulations directly obstructing erotic messages became
"content-based," and thus triggered strict scrutiny. 123
In contrast, "content-neutral" statutes were statutes that had the auxil-
iary effect of limiting the expression, but were not motivated by the expres-
sion.124 These statutes were subjected to a lower level of scrutiny.125 Far
from the context of stripping, United States v. O'Brien concerned the act of
burning a selective service registration card.126 The Supreme Court held that
121. See, e.g., Eric D. Kelly & Connie B. Cooper, Everything You Always Wanted to Know
About Regulating Sex Businesses, in PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORTs 2000
(Am. Plan. Ass'n, Nos. 495-496, 2000).
122. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66 (relying on other Supreme Court decisions concerning distri-
bution of obscene materials, topless dancing and nudity in theater performances to
conclude that nude dancing "is not without its First Amendment protections from
regulation").
123. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66-69.
124. Gregory Voshell, Bachelor Parties Beware: The Third Circuit Grapples with Alcohol,
Strip Clubs and the Constitutionality of Morality Legislation, 52 VILL. L. REV. 1095,
1100 (2007).
125. Voshell, supra note 124, at 1103, (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
373-75 (1968)).
126. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370.
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the military was permitted to limit the conduct of burning a draft card to
serve government interests in raising and maintaining an army.127 The
O'Brien inquiry asked 1) whether the regulation was within the constitu-
tional power of the government, 2) whether it furthered a substantial inter-
est of the government, 3) if the interest was unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and 4) if the incidental restriction was no greater than that
which was essential to the furtherance of the government interest.128
The Supreme Court later applied this test specifically to the stripping
context in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., where the Court examined whether
conduct regulations on strippers' table and lap dances were constitutional.
Strippers at the Glen Theatre were prohibited from absolute nudity and
were required to wear G-strings and pasties at all times of employment.
Justice Rehnquist found the anti-nudity requirement of G-strings and past-
ies for nude dancers sufficiently tailored to the state interest of preserving
public morality to meet the O'Brien standard of scrutiny.12 9 Justice Rehn-
quist further stated that while the First Amendment protected nude danc-
ing, it was at the "outer perimeters" of its protection.130 This analysis led to
a chasm in the Court, because some Justices argued that labeling public
morality a "state interest" was akin to regulating the content of the erotic
message. 131 Justice Souter advanced a concurring theory citing "secondary
effects"-that is, effects emanating from the general presence of the strip
club in the neighborhood-as the reason the state had a legitimate interest
in imposing regulations.132
The Court relied on Justice Souter's secondary effects theory in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,'13 3 which created the foundation for an
analytical inquiry that diverged from Barnes' value-laden approach.' 34 In
this case, the court upheld an ordinance prohibiting any adult entertain-
ment sites within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park or school.
This ordinance effectively prevented owners of the movie theater from ex-
hibiting pornographic films.135 The Court found that the ordinance was a
127. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
128. Voshell, supra note 124, at 1100.
129. Id. (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-72).
130. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
131. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560, 592-93 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
132. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that O'Brien's
requirement that the state present a substantial interest in enforcing a regulation on
free speech could be fulfilled by articulating a substantial interest in combatting the
"negative secondary effects associated with" strip clubs).
133. Voshell, supra note 124, at 1103-04 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
134. Id. at 1101.
135. Renton, 457 U.S. at 48.
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time, manner, and place restriction rather than an outright ban on adult
entertainment and that because it targeted the secondary effects of adult
entertainment-namely, the degrading of Renton's quality of "urban
life"-the municipality was justified in regulating the theater out of exis-
tence. 3 6 The ordinance was deemed to survive First Amendment challenges
because its purpose was to fight crime and protect business and property
values, rather than to impede clubs from distributing their erotic or porno-
graphic messages.' 3 7 In effect, the ruling permitted municipalities to reframe
any mild disturbance that an adult entertainment franchise-including a
strip club-could conjecturally cause, as a secondary effect. This analysis
flew in the face of the fact that such restrictions would effectively eliminate
strippers' ability to engage in what had previously been found to be pro-
tected speech.'13
In City ofErie v. Pap' A.M, the Court expanded the O'Brien test to
examine the constitutionality of an anti-nudity statute. The municipality of
Erie, Pennsylvania cleverly passed a statute making public nudity a summary
offense, thereby preventing the respondent corporation from operating
"Kandyland," a strip club.' 39 Even though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
struck down the statute as an unconstitutional content-based ban, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the decision and found that the statute passed con-
stitutional muster. 40 Rather than focusing on Barnes' public morality rea-
soning, it focused instead on the less controversial secondary effects of the
strip club to justify the substantial state interest at stake.' The court
adopted Justice Souter's secondary effects rationale and collapsed it into the
O'Brien inquiry to create a hybrid test.14 2 As Justice Souter had proposed in
his concurring opinion in Renton, municipalities could show that strip clubs
produced negative secondary effects to satisfy O'Brien's requirement that the
136. Renton, 457 U.S. at 48 (holding that "the ordinance by its terms is designed to
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally
'[protect] and [preserve] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial dis-
tricts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular
views"); Voshell, supra note 124, at 1103.
137. Renton, 457 U.S. at 48; see Eckert, supra note 9, at 242.
138. Renton, 457 U.S. at 51-52 (the Court approved the city's conjectural application of
secondary effects by explaining that "the First Amendment does not require a city,
before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence inde-
pendent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the
city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses").
139. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2000) (plurality opinion).
140. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 290.
141. See Voshell, supra note 124, at 1104-05.
142. Id.
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government present a substantial state interest in regulating expressive
speech in the strip clubs.
The secondary effects doctrine laid out in Justice Souter's concurring
opinion and applied by the majority in Erie was reaffirmed in City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, where the Supreme Court upheld another time,
manner, and place ordinance. Los Angeles passed a law prohibiting strip
clubs from operating in proximity to schools and parks based on a study
performed twenty-five years earlier that found that neighborhoods with
strip clubs had higher crime rates.143 Notably, in Alameda Books, the court
tightened the Renton inquiry by stating that a municipality must demon-
strate concrete empirical evidence of secondary effects in a specific jurisdic-
tion in order to establish a legitimate government interest.'4 4 However,
given that the Court permitted such an outdated report to form the basis of
Los Angeles' restrictions on strip clubs, the heightened standard was some-
what questionable.
Lower courts have applied the above line of cases either through a rote
application of Renton's majority opinion or by adopting a hybrid analysis
incorporating secondary effects into the O'Brien test.145 The cases have so-
lidified a general baseline assumption by courts that statutes regulating nude
dancing establishments do not infringe on speech when they do not ban
stripping outright and a municipality demonstrates a substantial state inter-
est that requires regulations. 4 6 However, courts diverge when determining
whether the state interest justifying the regulation in a particular case is
adequate.' 4 7 While some courts require empirical documentation of nega-
tive secondary effects to uphold restrictions on strip clubs, others presup-
pose that strip clubs derogate community standards and are in any
circumstance subject to strict regulations.
143. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 429-30, 436-37 (2002).
144. Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz & Bradley Shafer, Government Regulation of 'Adult" Busi-
nesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth ofNeg-
ative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 355, 365 (citing Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
at 313 (Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
145. Voshell, supra note 124, at 1106.
146. Id (stating that "circuit courts are either (1) applying Renton and its progeny; or (2)
applying some combination of Renton and O'Brien in light of Justice Souter's plural-
ity opinion in Pap's A.M.").
147. Id. at 1106-08 nn.68-82 (explaining in detail that while the Seventh Circuit has
applied the Renton majority's analysis, it appears that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Eight Circuits have adopted the secondary effects doctrine laid out by Justice
Souter in the Renton concurrence and codified by Pap's A.M.).
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B. Secondary Effects Studies: Methodological Inaccuracies
While courts differ in how they scrutinize the legitimacy of state inter-
ests, localities consistently advance secondary effects arguments to trigger a
more lenient standard of scrutiny for regulations. However, secondary ef-
fects doctrine is mired in methodological inconsistencies and often fails to
meaningfully address the full breadth of harms a strip club can bring to a
community-not least of all, the abuse and exploitation of its workers.
Secondary effects studies have been roundly criticized for lacking con-
vincing evidentiary support.' 4 8 Critics have demonstrated that studies on
secondary effects have been methodologically inconsistent and recycled in
communities with stark differences to the community in which the original
study was conducted.' 4 9 For example, courts often permit localities to intro-
duce data that is decades old and from across the country.5 0 Courts have
not articulated a clear standard for evidentiary support, thereby permitting a
range of unreliable information based on subjective surveys, out of town
appraisals, and outdated crime information to guide legal analysis.15I In a
critical study of the top ten secondary effects studies used by localities to
justify regulation of sexually oriented businesses, social scientists found that
most of the studies did not fulfill "professional standards of scientific in-
quiry" and "basic assumptions necessary to calculate an error rate."152
Further, there has been criticism within the Supreme Court regarding
the efficacy of the preventive regulations imposed. For example, many ordi-
nances require G-strings and pasties for nude dancers, regardless of whether
they perform lap dances or stage dances.'15 Justice Souter'54 and Justice Ste-
148. Paul et al., supra note 144, at 366-76.
149. Id
150. See, e.g., Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 725 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, StrippingAway FirstAmendment Rights: The
Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
287, 317, 323 (2003-2004).
151. Calvert & Richards, supra note 150, at 323 ("The old adage about comparing apples
and oranges is particularly relevant in the secondary effects context because many
courts allow municipalities to consider studies and other evidence arising from far
different circumstances."); Paul et al., supra note 144, at 391 ("the courts may be
best served by turning to standards laid out in Daubert for the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence. The application of such standards, bolstered by Justice Souter's opin-
ion in Pap's, may force the courts to reject the studies previously relied upon as
evidence of negative secondary effects, and require new, more methodologically
sound, studies to demonstrate a compelling government interest in regulating
nudity.").
152. Paul et al., supra note 144, at 374.
153. See Adler, supra note 50, at 1127-29.
154. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 319 (2000).
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vens'15 have openly questioned the purported potential such scanty regula-
tions have to ameliorate secondary effects caused by completely nude
dancing. Even Justice Scalia, while concurring in Pap's A.M, wrote, "I am
highly skeptical, to the tell the truth, that the addition of pasties and G-
strings will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kandyland
to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster sexually transmitted
disease."156
Arguments attacking both the existence of secondary effects and the
efficacy of regulations purporting to control them expose such regulations as
a front for content-based attempts to shut down strip clubs altogether.157
However, courts have embraced faulty secondary effects studies in order to
preserve a route through which municipalities can move strip clubs-and
the strippers they employ-to the margins of their communities. At the
same time, courts and municipalities have largely ignored the labor abuses
and sexual violence that occurs in the strip clubs, which is arguably the most
salient justification for state regulation. The continued use of such legal
reasoning-which ignores the harms strippers experience and instead fur-
thers strippers' marginalization-greatly undermines arguments that legali-
zation of prostitution will lead to successful integration of members of the
commercial sex trade into their communities.
C. A Feminist Critique of First Amendment Analyses
Aside from the methodological weaknesses of the secondary effects
doctrine, its ideological underpinnings-and the harmful effects it ig-
nores-have come under substantial criticism from feminist legal scholars.
These critics argue that the secondary effects doctrine's focus on property
devaluation, prostitution and public health gloss over the most pervasive
and dangerous harm of all-harm to women inside the club.158 While shop-
pers' unwillingness to buy on the same street as a strip club motivates
lawmakers' regulation of strip clubs, women's vulnerability to harassment
and assault inside the clubs does not.
Even more problematically, legal analysis places the stripper at the
heart of the threat to the community, rather than identifying her as a key
member of the community under threat. For example, municipalities enact
"no-touch ordinances" regulating the distance between a stripper and her
customer out of a desire to control the spread of disease and illicit prostitu-
tion, rather than to protect the stripper from unwanted touching or sexual
155. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 317-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Calvert & Richards, supra note 150, at 290, 301.
158. Paul et al., supra note 144, at 374; Eckert, supra note 9, at 266.
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assault.'15 Much of the justification around regulating the distance between
strippers and their customers is couched in "public health" language, thus
envisaging the transaction as tainted, unsafe, and diseased.' 60 Amy Adler
criticizes doctrinal analysis because it "unwittingly replicates a deeper cul-
tural trope in which the nude woman's body stands for danger, debasement,
crime, violence, disease, a threat to the institution of heterosexuality, and
even death."16 t In identifying secondary effects, courts often fail to state
explicitly that the increases in crime surrounding a strip club are crimes of
gender-based violencel 62 and that strippers often experience coercion into
prostitution due to unfair labor practices. In other words, gender is a forgot-
ten-or forbidden-word in First Amendment analysis of the harmful ef-
fects of the strip club.' 63
One possible reason for this analytical omission is that gender-based
ha rms might be construed as primar rather than secondary effects. If
lawmakers argued that the message communicated by the dance itself was
the source of gender-based violence in the club, then that could potentially
implicate the erotic content of the stripper's performance and trigger strict
scrutiny.' 64 Lawmakers could assert that the state's interest in protecting
women from gender-based violence should surmount even the highest form
of scrutiny reserved for content-based regulations. However, the Supreme
Court has never meaningfully addressed whether gender-based violence in
strip clubs is a negative secondary effect, let alone whether regulations to
prevent such violence would constitute a compelling state interest.
Legislators and courts are not willing to wash their hands entirely of
the delicate problem of strip clubs. Where the lines of public morality are
easy to draw, they are prepared to step in as protectors of the innocent
constituents who suffer from the strip club's presence in their neighbor-
hoods. Indeed, innovative legal arguments have developed justifying eco-
nomic and geographic marginalization of sexually oriented businesses.
Beyond the fact that most of these regulations offer little protective value to
strippers, some argue their sole purpose is to drive business away from strip
clubs.165 If legislatures achieve this goal, regulations exert further economic
159. See generally Eckert, supra note 9 at 264; Adler, supra note 50, at 1127.
160. Eckert, supra note 9, at 263-64.
161. Adler, supra note 50, at 1127.
162. See Jeffreys, supra note 6, at 99 (citing STRIP MAGAZINE, which warns "the odds of
being stalked, mugged and attached (sic) are on increase and you must always keep
your guard up").
163. Eckert, supra note 9, at 252.
164. Id. at 263.
165. Calvert, supra note 150, at 329.
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strain on the stripper as business becomes slower and tips become even
more difficult to collect.16 6
Where local lawmakers have not had to disrupt the baseline assump-
tion that strippers are undeserving of protection, they have vigorously
pushed to regulate the tawdry world of the strip club. Consequently, efforts
to regulate strip clubs elide meaningful analyses of the gender-based indigni-
ties and inequities of strip clubs. As Amy Adler notes, this enables First
Amendment jurisprudence to "paradoxically picture the stripper as infec-
tious and inconsequential all at once."167 This conception has made govern-
ment regulation more of a hindrance than a help to the stripper's social
predicament.
D. Recent Developments in First Amendment Doctrine
In recent years, state rape crisis coalitions have used the secondary
effects doctrine to propose taxes on strip clubs to fund rape crisis centers.
These taxes have been controversially labeled "pole taxes"168 or "skin
taxes" 69 and ignited a public debate around whether the strip club industry
should take responsibility for contributing to sexual exploitation.170 Nota-
bly, efforts by the rape crisis community to pass such taxes have elevated the
public conversation around the rights of strippers and their right to be free
from gender-based violence like all members of their community.
This string of legislation began in 2007, when the Texas Association
Against Sexual Assault proposed the Sexual Oriented Business Fee Act,
which for the first time proposed a five dollar head tax on strip clubs that
served alcohol, the proceeds of which were primarily used to establish a
166. See Majic, supra note 41, at 24-25. Majic points out Las Vegas clubs increase supply
of strippers to heighten competition between strippers for tips. Logically, it follows
that decreased demand (caused by zoning ordinances that make clubs less accessible)
would cause heightened competition and thinner distribution of tips, making strip-
pers even more economically vulnerable.
167. Adler, supra note 153, at 1147.
168. Dahleen Glanton, Parsing the 'vole tax," CHI. TRI., Aug. 28, 2012, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-28/news/ct-talk-glanton-rape-20120828
.1_pole-tax-strip-clubs-strip-club-owners.
169. Ray Long & Alissa Groeninger, Illinois strip clubs could face $5 "skin tax," CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-16/
news/ct-met-illinois-stripper-tax-20120216_lpole-tax-strip-clubs-d-olympia-fields.
170. Is Illinois Strip Club Tax Funding Rape Crisis Centers Fair?, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug.




sexual assault program fund.'17 Advocates pushed the bill to fund the in-
credible need for increased resources in the rape crisis community. 72
The bill ignited uproar in the entertainment industry, and the Texas
Entertainment Association (TEA) sued state officials after the bill went into
effect.'17 The TEA argued that the bill unconstitutionally infringed First
Amendment speech.'1 4 The Texas Supreme Court held that the bill was
constitutional, focusing on the fact that the tax was not intended to limit
the expressive element of nude dancing, but to prevent the negative secon-
dary effects of sexual harm that arose from the combination of alcohol and
live adult entertainment.1 7 5 The TEA appealed to the Supreme Court,
which denied writ of certiorari. 7 6
Since the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Illinois has passed a
similar law, integrating some of the Texas Supreme Court's secondary ef-
fects arguients directly into the Uody U it sttute."7 In its legislative flnd-
ings, the law states explicitly that "[iut is the intent of the General Assembly
to ameliorate the negative secondary effects associated with the combination
of sexually oriented businesses and alcohol so as to promote the health,
safety and welfare of the citizens of Illinois."17 8 In a press conference intro-
ducing the Illinois bill, State Senator Toi Hutchinson stated: "We all need to
be working toward a society that understands violence against women is
inappropriate in all circumstances, and all times."'7 Hutchinson's statement
powerfully acknowledged, for possibly the first time by a public official, that
strippers' dignity and safety was as important as the safety of all women who
experience gender inequality and the violence that arises from it. 1so
Other states have introduced or strategized about introducing bills
similar to those of Texas and Illinois, continuing to innovate on legislative
language to ensure strippers receive protection from industry backlash
171. H.B. 1751, 80th Tex. Leg. §§ 47.001-47.004 (Tex. 2007), available at http://www.
legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtext/html/HBO1751F.htm.
172. Id.
173. Morgan Smith, High Court Approves "Pole Tax"on Strip Clubs, TEX. TIUB. (Aug. 26,
2011), available at http://www.texastribune.org/texas-taxes/strip-club-fee/high-
court-approves-pole-tax-strip-clubs/.
174. Combs v. Tex. Entm't Ass'n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Tex. 2011).
175. Combs, 347 S.W.3d at 287-88.
176. Tex. Entm't Ass'n v. Combs, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1015 (2012).
177. See, e.g., 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/3 (2012).
178. Id.
179. Ray Long & Alissa Groeninger, Illinois strip clubs could face $5 'skin tax', CHI. TRIB.,
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-16/news/ct-met-illi-
nois-stripper-tax-20120216-1_pole-tax-strip-clubs-d-olympia-fields
180. The Pole Tax, workshop at Revive, Rethink, Reclaim! National Sexual Assault Con-
ference (Aug. 22, 2012) (speakers included Torie Camp and Polly Poskin).
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against taxation.181 In California, for example, legislatures introduced a bill
that explicitly prohibited strip clubs from "reimbursing" the tax from their
employees, attempting to prevent further exploitation of strippers through
the collection of such a tax. 18 2 The bill died in the Assembly's Appropria-
tions Committee.183
While these developments demonstrate a growing sensitivity that
strippers are victims, rather than agents, of the negative secondary effects of
strip clubs, their use to date remains limited to raising taxes, which does not
directly ameliorate the labor conditions of strippers or prevent ongoing at-
tempts by municipalities to push strippers to the outskirts of their commu-
nities. None of the arguments put forth to advance the passage of strip club
taxes has been utilized to impose regulatory requirements on strip club own-
ers to improve safety measures or labor conditions within their establish-
ments. While the rhetoric of gender-based violence in the pole tax debate
has raised awareness about the dangers facing strippers on a daily basis, it
has not yet been parlayed into meaningful reforms to address labor practices
that exploit strippers, and draconian zoning ordinances that enable such
exploitation to persist.
IV. THE STRIPPER'S BODY AS A SITE OF ENTANGLEMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGALIZED SEX WORK
Strippers inhabit an artificially constrained legal universe bound by
underlying contradictions in cultural norms. The strip club is rife with ex-
ploitation when strippers' unprotected employment status enables employ-
ers to create arbitrary wage schemes and take a sizeable portion of strippers'
wages while denying them basic safety and anti-discrimination protections.
Given the intimacy of the labor involved, this economic pressure from strip-
pers' bosses distorts the consensual nature of stripping and further under-
mines the rights of strippers as workers. Lack of public will to regulate this
relationship denies strippers positive rights to fair wages, regulated hours
and freedom to organize, as courts incorrectly define their legal relationship
to strip club owners. Legislative reticence to intervene on behalf of strippers
emblemizes public disdain of the stripper and reinforces the notion that
stripping is not work worthy of legal protection.
181. Id. See also Ellen Yin-Wycoff, Illinois Passes Strip Club Tax, CALIFORNIA COALITION
AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://calcasa.org/calcasal
illinois-passes-strip-club-tax/.
182. The Pole Tax, supra note 180; see also A.B. 2441 § 3 (Cal. Leg. 2011-2012); Yin-
Wycoff, supra note 181.
183. Yin-Wycoff, supra note 181.
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At the same time, the government sees stripping as a market good
worth protecting. The First Amendment has been invoked to safeguard
erotic expression,18 4 which has been placed in conceptual tension with sec-
ondary injuries to surrounding communities. Harm suffered by strippers
has never meaningfully fallen into the ambit of government interests suffi-
cient to regulate strip clubs. Thus, the main impact that strippers experience
from local restrictions is a drop in business, which raises the financial stakes
and intensifies the economic coercion they already experience. These regula-
tions can thus be conceived as truncating strippers' negative rights against
the government to make independent choices regarding their livelihood.
The twin pressures of morality-based, secondary effects regulation and
economic deregulation of the employment relationship situates the stripper
in a vacuum of legal protection. Strippers inhabit a high-risk market provid-
ing no corresponding state protection. wherein they are coerced to perform
services they otherwise would not, outside of the view of the community at
large and with no legal recourse to address resulting harms. Unfortunately,
the morass of legislation and regulation entangling the stripper obscures the
legal vacuum. Few would surmise that an industry so laden with restrictions
and licensing rules could evade basic legal requirements for a fair and safe
workplace.
The stripper's predicament raises serious questions about the legaliza-
tion of sex work in other industries. One of the most salient arguments in
favor of legalization of prostitution is that workers could obtain greater pro-
tection through government regulation and monitoring of abuses against
individuals in the sex trade. 85 Advocates argue that regulated "sex work"
would lift prostitution out of the underworld of organized crime, bring a
veneer of professionalism to the practice, lead to government funding for
disease and violence prevention, foster better allocation of scarce law en-
forcement resources, and generally alleviate the stigma and attendant state
negligence of prostitutes' well-being and safety.18 6 So, too, can the American
stripper's experience be seen as a failed experiment in legalization: courts
and legislators have made doctrinal contortions to avoid protecting strippers
from the systematic exploitation endemic to the industry.
184. For an interesting discussion of the Supreme Court's euphemistic word choice of
"erotic" expression, see Eckert, supra note 9, 256-57. Eckert discusses the conceptual
difference between erotica, derived from the Green root eros and indicating consen-
sual and equal love, and pornography, whose etymological root is porne, and which
refers to a harlot, prostitute or female captive.
185. See generally Chrisje Brants, The Fine Art ofRegulated Tolerance: Prostitution in Am-
sterdam, 25 J.L. & Soc'y 621 (1998); JoHN F. DECKER, PROSTITUTION: REGULA-
TION AND CONTROL (1979).
186. See generally Decker, supra note 185.
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This begs the question: Would legalizing prostitution really afford
greater legal protection? What if legalizing prostitution gives the commercial
sex industry a false veneer of legitimacy that obscures the accepted exploita-
tive practices that occur beneath its surface? It is highly unlikely that indi-
viduals engaged in prostitution would be seen as employees even if they
worked for brothels or organized escort services. It is likely that such institu-
tions, if legalized, would receive similar treatment to strip clubs, forcing
prostituted people into inequitable contracts and constructing a legal rela-
tionship that preempts employer liability. Further, considering that prosti-
tution is one of the central "secondary effects" that justifies regulating strip
clubs, there is little doubt that a flood of regulatory restrictions would be
placed on a legalized prostitution industry. Whether people in prostitution
would fare better than strippers under such regulations is unclear; however,
the stripper's experience suggests that government regulations on prostitu-
tion will be motivated by vice control, rather than a meaningful response to
sexual exploitation.
In a moral universe where the commercial sex industry, whether strip-
ping or prostitution, is simply tolerated, legal determinations will lack the
legitimacy necessary to enforce meaningful labor protections. Thus, advo-
cates must raise awareness about the stripper's work as work, rather than as
a deviant social activity conducted at the margins of social order. There are
serious moral problems intrinsic to the strip club, not least of all that
women's bodies are sold for money, sexual subordination is legitimized as a
market good, and gender inequality is reinforced through imbalances of
power. Ignoring these abuses compounds the deep-seated gender, class and
race inequalities that lead women to the commercial sex industry in the first
place.
A number of reforms have potential to acknowledge the social realities
of the stripper without legitimizing the abuses and indignities of stripping.
First of all, mandating that strippers who qualify under prevailing legal defi-
nitions be treated as employees, rather than independent contractors, for
purposes of the FLSA, Title VII, the NLRA, and other state and federal
labor statutes would help alleviate current abusive practices in the strip
club.187 One successful method of implementing such a reform is creating
employee misclassification statutes that penalize employers for listing em-
ployees as independent contractors in order to evade their legal obligations.
New Jersey, Michigan, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Maryland, and
New York have passed misclassification statutes protecting specific indus-
tries, and federal legislation is pending to penalize misclassification of em-
187. Fischer, supra note 10, at 552-53.
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ployees under an amendment to the FLSA.'"8 Conferring employee status
on strippers who meet the requirements of the economic realities test pro-
vides strippers with desperately needed legal protections and drives up the
cost of business for club owners, forcing them to engage in serious restruc-
turing of current labor practices. It also eliminates the most egregious forms
of abuse from the customer's menu of options. Secondly, courts and legisla-
tures should work to eradicate exploitative tip-out and commission models
that tether workers to indentured sexual servitude to their employer, limit-
ing their freedom to enter and exit their employment at-will.
In the context of First Amendment jurisprudence, localities and indi-
viduals could enact regulations that impose criminal and civil sanctions on
abusive customers and employers. Rigorous anti-harassment policies for
strippers could be incorporated into licensing requirements for strip clubs.
While these types of protections rnight be deemed content-based. courts
have the purview to find rape prevention and bodily protection of strippers
a substantial state interest that passes muster under even the most rigorous
scrutiny. At the very least, communities could engage in meaningful public
dialogue about the harms suffered by those inside the strip club with the
most limited amount of choice to be there. The pole tax debate has helped
to initiate such dialogue, but the next step should be to use these newer,
more sensitive explications of strip clubs' negative secondary effects to pro-
mote stricter regulation of the labor practices inside the clubs. Finally, a sea
change in communal attitudes can only occur in conjunction with height-
ened organizing protections for strippers, so that strippers can communicate
their experiences to each other and to the larger community without fear of
employer retaliation.
The fact that these measures have not been even remotely broached in
public discourse belies the claim that legalization of sex work fluidly leads to
protection of sex workers. Until these types of reforms are meaningfully
addressed in an already legalized sex industry, advocates for legalization of
prostitution should reconsider the purported benefits of "legitimizing" sex
work through legal recognition.
CONCLUSION
Workers in many industries are paid to make others feel "good," and
that duty is often infused with sexual expectations.' 89 The stripper is situ-
ated on a spectrum of sexual exploitation, which includes the prostitute, but
can and has also encompassed the waitress, the stewardess, the hostess, and
188. Employee Misclassification Prevention Act, H.R. 3178, 112th Cong. (2011).
189. See McGinley, supra note 20, at 91.
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other members of the service industry. Sex is seen as a legitimate market
good to be purchased and sold. To fail to recognize the stripper on a contin-
uum of sexualized labor is to cast out the stripper using capricious distinc-
tions.19 0 Legal discourse has the ability to meaningfully explore the
problems surrounding commoditized sexual labor, but in the context of the
strip club, courts have remained woefully silent. This silence permits the
market demand for sexual exploitation and explains its persistence.
The presence of the legalized strip club is a reflection upon society as a
whole. It cannot be ignored or explained away through legal contrivance.
Mistreatment of the stripper is a manifestation of social entitlement to sati-
ate desires for control and sexual subordination at the proper price. To di-
vorce a "community" from the strip club customers who comprise it
amounts to a collective disavowal of social responsibility. Ignoring the legal
and economic dilemmas of the stripper creates the most significant erosion
of all to a community: it reinforces the notion that a person's dignity can be
bought and sold. Workers everywhere, clothed or unclothed, "legitimate" or
cast aside, suffer as a result. To avert this danger, lawmakers and courts must
extricate the stripper from the troubled dialectics of vice regulation and la-
bor deregulation and vindicate the legitimate claims to safety and bodily
integrity that she rightfully deserves. t
190. Id. at 95.
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